Over the course of my years representing individual plaintiffs in personal injury cases, I discovered that the most difficult battles were not always against insurance companies or opposing counsel.

Sometimes the greatest struggle arose from within the solicitor-client relationship itself. Clients who refused to return phone calls, ignored correspondence, or rejected legal advice could render representation virtually impossible. In those circumstances, no matter how committed I was to pursuing their case, I was forced by both professional ethics and procedural law to bring a motion to be removed as solicitor of record. I must have personally attended on at least 100 such motions over my career.

The Law Society of Ontario’s Rules of Professional Conduct^[1] provide the ethical foundation for withdrawal. A lawyer is required to step aside when there has been a serious loss of confidence, a fundamental breakdown in communication, or persistent refusal to follow advice. The Rules make it clear that a lawyer cannot continue to act effectively under such conditions. At the same time, Ontario’s Rules of Civil Procedure^[2] reinforce this duty. Rule 15.04 stipulates that once a lawyer is on record, they may not simply walk away. They must seek an order of the court, giving notice to the client, before being removed from the record. The combination of these ethical and procedural requirements ensures that withdrawal is not taken lightly, but that it remains available when the relationship has failed beyond repair.

The courts have long recognized that an irreparable breakdown between lawyer and client justifies withdrawal. In Vaillancourt v. Sloss, 2015 ONSC 7751^[3] , for example, the court reiterated that “good cause” is required for withdrawal and outlined the factors to be considered, including whether the client had been given adequate notice, whether they had a fair opportunity to secure new counsel, and whether the timing of the withdrawal would prejudice the administration of justice. These decisions reflect the balance courts strive to maintain. Protecting the client’s right to representation while also acknowledging the ethical obligations of the lawyer.

The evidentiary foundation for a motion to be removed as solicitor of record is relatively straightforward, but it must be carefully handled. In an affidavit supporting the motion, counsel sets out the facts establishing the breakdown without disclosing privileged details or litigation strategy. This often includes a history of attempts to communicate—emails sent, letters mailed, phone calls placed and documented—and the client’s consistent failure to respond. It may include evidence of missed appointments or written refusals to accept advice. The key is to demonstrate to the court, with neutral and factual evidence, that the solicitor-client relationship has become unworkable.

In practice, clients sometimes actually appear at the motion in an effort to oppose their lawyer’s withdrawal. They insist that they do not want the lawyer to leave the file, despite having ignored every effort at communication and rejected every piece of advice. What typically happens in these moments is that the presiding judge poses the decisive question:

“Why do you want your lawyer to stay on your file if you do not trust them, will not talk to them, and will not follow their advice?”

Time and again I have seen that single question dissolve the opposition. Judges understand that effective representation cannot exist in the absence of communication and trust, and they will not force a lawyer to continue under those circumstances.

The practical lessons from these experiences are clear. When faced with a disengaged or hostile client, a lawyer must remain professional, maintain a careful record of all attempts at communication, and act promptly once it is clear the relationship is beyond repair. Privilege must always be preserved, and filings must be strictly factual, free of editorial comment.

When a lawyer seeks to remove themselves as solicitor of record, one of the most delicate requirements is the preservation of solicitor-client privilege. Even in the midst of a fractured and unworkable relationship, that privilege remains absolute, and it cannot be compromised simply because the lawyer is withdrawing. For that reason, it is common practice for the moving lawyer to prepare an affidavit setting out only the bare procedural facts on the public record, while any sensitive detail about the breakdown of the relationship is conveyed in a separate sealed affidavit or by handing a separate affidavit directly to the presiding judge through the court clerk. This ensures the court understands the basis for the withdrawal while protecting the client’s confidences from disclosure.

The motion itself must be served on opposing counsel, but opposing counsel almost never attends, as they have no standing to resist a lawyer’s withdrawal and no interest in hearing about privileged matters. On occasion, I have even seen judges ask members of opposing firms who happen to be present in the courtroom to step outside before receiving such an affidavit, in order to guard against any inadvertent disclosure of information that could compromise the client’s privilege. This careful choreography underscores the legal profession’s enduring obligation. Even when the relationship collapses, the lawyer’s duty to protect the client’s secrets does not.

The process is not about abandonment but about ensuring that both lawyer and client are not trapped in a dysfunctional relationship that serves neither justice nor the client’s best interests.

In the end, withdrawal is a professional safeguard. When communication collapses and trust disappears, remaining on the record would compromise not only the client’s case but also the lawyer’s ethical obligations.

In Baradaran v. Alexanian, 2020 ONSC 4759^[4], the court considered a contested withdrawal motion where the client opposed his lawyer’s removal. Master Robinson confirmed that the principles from R. v. Cunningham, 2010 SCC 10^[5], apply equally in the civil context, requiring the court to assess whether there is good cause for withdrawal, whether adequate notice has been given, whether the client can obtain new counsel or self-represent, and whether withdrawal would cause prejudice or undermine the administration of justice. Finding an irretrievable breakdown of trust and communication, the court held it would be unfair to require counsel to remain on the record and granted the motion.

The jurisprudence in Ontario, from Vaillancourt to Baradaran confirms that courts recognize this reality. Judges are prepared to grant such motions when the breakdown is genuine, provided the lawyer has given proper notice and acted with professionalism. These moments are never pleasant, but they are necessary. The duty to withdraw when the solicitor-client relationship has failed is not a choice; it is an obligation, rooted in ethics and affirmed by law.