The Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in Meldazy v. Nassar (2025 ONCA 590)^[1] provides a careful look at how trial judges manage jury questions, address causation in the context of successive accidents, and handle contested expert evidence. While not revolutionary in doctrine, it reinforces enduring themes: the importance of simplicity, the dangers of overcomplicating jury instructions, and the central role of credibility and damage assessment in chronic pain cases. For both counsel and mediators, the case carries practical lessons about risk, strategy, and the unpredictability of juries.

The Background

The background is familiar to many personal injury litigators, one I have faced many times in practice and now frequently as mediator.

In 2016, Paul Meldazy was rear-ended by a TTC bus, an incident he said caused chronic pain, psychological conditions including depression and anxiety, and a lasting loss of earning capacity. Unfortunately, he was later involved in two more accidents, one in 2017 and another in 2021, both of which the defence argued were significant contributors to his problems. The case went to trial before a jury, where the TTC and its driver admitted negligence but forcefully disputed causation and damages. After a five-week trial, the jury awarded Meldazy over $1.5 million, spread across categories including general damages, past and future income loss, care costs, and housekeeping.

The defendants appealed, raising issues with the jury questions, the judge’s handling of credibility and instructions, and the treatment of the plaintiff’s expert on past income loss.

Causation and Jury Questions

On causation, the defendants argued that the trial judge should have required the jury to answer a direct question about whether the bus accident caused injury. The Court of Appeal was not persuaded. It acknowledged that even if negligence was admitted, causation remained a live issue. But it held that the single damages question posed to the jury, combined with clear “but for” causation instructions, was sufficient. The Court stressed that jury questions and instructions work “hand in glove,” and here the charge made clear that damages could only be awarded if the jury was satisfied the injuries would not have occurred but for the bus accident.

The lesson is that complex jury questions are not necessary to preserve a causation defence. What matters is whether the jury, through the instructions and the framing of the single damages question, understood its task. Defence counsel should therefore ensure that their causation theory is fully embedded in closing submissions and reflected in the charge, rather than relying on complicated written questions.

Apportionment Between Accidents

The more difficult appellate issue concerned apportionment of damages between successive accidents. Defence counsel attempted to rely on Athey v. Leonati, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 458^[2], and on older Ontario authority such as Hicks v. Cooper (1973), 1 O.R. (2d) 221^[3], which provides a model for handling multiple accidents through separate assessments.

The problem was that the proposed jury questions did not follow the Hicks structure. Instead of a clean first-accident assessment and a deduction approach, the defendants asked the jury to divide damages across the accidents by percentage, even where indivisible injuries might be involved. The trial judge rejected the formulation as confusing and unfair, and the Court of Appeal agreed. The ruling shows that apportionment must be grounded in tested models. Novel or percentage-based approaches may appear creative but will not withstand appellate scrutiny if they create confusion or risk leaning the jury toward a particular outcome.

Credibility and the Judge’s Summary

Another ground of appeal concerned the judge’s summary of the plaintiff’s evidence. The defence argued that by not including one specific point about a statement made to an insurance adjuster, the trial judge blunted their credibility attack. The Court dismissed this argument, noting that juries are repeatedly told to rely on their own recollection of the evidence and not to treat the judge’s summary as exhaustive. Counsel’s own cross-examination and closing are where credibility points must be driven home. The ruling reinforces that credibility is a battlefield for counsel, not something to be fought in the charge conference.

Expert Evidence on Past Income Loss

The final challenge related to the plaintiff’s expert on past income loss. Because the plaintiff worked in a family construction business with a compensation package tied to both hours and company profits, damages were inherently difficult to calculate. The plaintiff’s expert took a comparative approach, valuing the loss in terms of the cost of replacing services the plaintiff could no longer perform. The defence attacked the methodology as flawed and sought an instruction that the evidence be disregarded.

The trial judge refused, and the Court upheld that decision, noting that the defence had not objected to qualification or admissibility at trial. Any flaws went to weight, not admissibility. The jury ultimately awarded $90,000 for past income loss, a number the Court found was within their discretion given the evidence.

The case is a reminder that objections must be preserved at the admissibility stage. Otherwise, the evidence goes to the jury, and counsel must work to diminish its weight through cross-examination and competing expert testimony.

Lessons for Mediation

For mediators, Meldazy v. Nassar offers insights into how chronic pain and multiple-accident cases unfold.

The first lesson is that causation disputes create real uncertainty. Even when negligence is admitted, causation of particular injuries or income loss remains hotly contested. Juries may not parse apportionment models with precision, and appellate courts are reluctant to interfere unless the instructions are plainly wrong. That unpredictability increases the settlement value of mediation, since both sides face risk.

Second, the case shows again that credibility is central in chronic pain litigation. Mediation provides a chance for counsel to reality-test whether their theory of credibility will resonate, given how juries are instructed to decide for themselves.

Third, the Court’s willingness to accept imperfect expert evidence reflects how damages assessments are more art than science. Mediators can use this point in caucus. The jury may simply “split the difference,” and certainty through settlement is often preferable to speculation.

Finally, the deference appellate courts give to juries on damage awards reinforces the settlement imperative. Once a jury speaks, it is very difficult to disturb the numbers.

Conclusion

In the end, Meldazy v. Nassar stands as a cautionary tale for counsel and a useful case study for mediators. Counsel must anchor their jury questions in established precedent, preserve objections to expert evidence when it matters, and recognize that credibility battles are theirs to fight, not the judge’s. Mediators can remind parties that causation in successive-accident cases, particularly involving chronic pain, is a fertile ground for uncertainty, and that uncertainty is best managed through negotiated resolution rather than leaving the result to a jury.