About This Article

Written by Toronto-based mediator and former insurer defence counsel/personal injury lawyer Shawn Patey, this article offers a firsthand account of the evolution of Ontario’s auto insurance system over the past 35 years. From the introduction of the Ontario Motorist Protection Plan (OMPP) in 1990 to the present-day impact of the Minor Injury Guideline (MIG), the author reflects on the legislative shifts, courtroom trends, and regulatory reforms that have shaped personal injury litigation and accident benefits in Ontario. This historical and professional commentary is a valuable resource for lawyers, insurers, and mediators navigating SABS claims, tort thresholds, and FSCO’s legacy. The article also examines the impact of Bills 164, 59, and the anticipated 2025 civil procedure reforms.

Policy, Practice, and the Potholes in Between: A Mediator’s Firsthand Journey Through 35 Years of Ontario Auto Insurance Reform

by Shawn Patey ~ Mediator

Introduction: Life Before No-Fault

I initially stepped into the world of insurance law in the late 1980s when I was 23 years old. I had just finished my first year at Queen’s Law School, and had landed a coveted summer job at Smith Lyons, then a leading Bay Street defence litigation firm (now part of Gowlings WLG). The David Peterson Liberal government had recently swept into power in Ontario in 1985, ending over four decades of uninterrupted Progressive Conservative rule that had begun in 1943. The Ontario auto insurance regime was still anchored in a cumbersome, tort-based model. Accident victims had little to no access to statutory benefits. If you were hurt, your only path to compensation was to hire a lawyer to sue the at-fault driver, and prove it, and that could take years.

As a young aspiring defence lawyer, I was entering a system where every whiplash claim could spiral into years of litigation, adversarial with a capital A. Minor injuries demanded full-blown trials. Delay was endemic. Adjusters struggled to manage exploding litigation budgets, more often than not with little or no chance of recovering costs from impecunious plaintiffs. Plaintiffs waited years for modest recoveries. And insurers, caught in the middle, were facing spiraling premiums and mounting loss ratios.

The rules encouraged combat, not resolution. The court dockets were jammed, mediation was still a novelty. Even the clearest liability cases could languish over quantum fights. It was an adversarial landscape that was expensive, inefficient, and, increasingly, politically unsustainable.

At the same time, the sheer cost of the tort-driven system had a ripple effect. Insurance premiums were climbing so rapidly that a growing number of Ontario motorists were simply driving without coverage. By the mid1980s, rapid increases in liability claims were pushing premium rates to unsustainable levels, and insurance capacity became scarce, leading many Ontario motorists to drive uninsured.[1] This was not just a theoretical problem. Serious accidents occurred every day involving uninsured drivers. Before the introduction of no-fault benefits under the OMPP, injured parties often had to sue to recover damages. If the at-fault driver was uninsured or unidentified, compensation was limited to what could be recovered through the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund or uninsured motorist coverage. In cases where no benefits were available, the burden of care often fell to the public healthcare system. Hospitals and OHIP absorbed the costs of long-term rehabilitation, surgeries, and attendant care, while victims and their families were left without recourse. The system was failing not just private stakeholders, but the Ontario tax-paying public.

The 1990 OMPP: David Peterson’s No-Fault Revolution

By the mid 1980s, it was clear that Ontario’s tort-based auto insurance regime was buckling under the weight of its own inefficiencies. In response, the Liberal government of Premier David Peterson commissioned an in-depth review of the province’s motor vehicle accident compensation framework.

The Ontario Task Force on Insurance, more commonly known as the Slater Commission, was convened in response to mounting public concern over the affordability and accessibility of insurance in the province during the mid-1980s. Chaired by Justice Samuel H. Slater, the commission delivered its findings in May 1986, identifying serious inefficiencies and imbalances in the auto insurance system[2]. The Commission criticized the adversarial, litigation-heavy model of claims resolution, highlighting that a disproportionate amount of premiums were being consumed by legal and administrative costs rather than direct compensation to accident victims. The Slater Commission’s findings laid the groundwork for a series of reforms to Ontario’s auto insurance regime, including the introduction of no-fault benefits and a greater emphasis on streamlined dispute resolution, policy shifts that continue to influence the structure of personal injury litigation and insurance settlements in Ontario today.

The resulting report, Ontario Motorist Protection Plan: A Plan for Reform (1990)[3], laid the intellectual groundwork for what would become the most significant overhaul in the province’s history of auto insurance law. The report concluded that the existing fault-based system encouraged excessive litigation, delayed compensation, and left too many injured motorists inadequately protected.

As an articling student in a leading defence firm at the time, I recall the seismic shift felt throughout the insurance world. Unveiled on June 22, 1990, the Ontario Motorist Protection Plan (OMPP) marked the province’s first formal transition to a no-fault insurance model. As part of a broader firm initiative, I worked with fellow articling students to deliver presentations and author papers analyzing the new scheme’s implications for defence practice. Drawing inspiration from comparable systems in U.S. jurisdictions like Michigan and New York, the OMPP sought to balance improved accessibility for accident victims with the need to contain escalating insurance costs. The OMPP introduced standardized no-fault accident benefits, including income replacement benefits of up to $600 per week for eligible claimants who were substantially unable to perform the essential tasks of their employment[4]. At the same time, it imposed a strict threshold on the right to sue, permitting tort claims only in cases involving death or “permanent serious impairment of an important physical, mental or psychological function.” The plan also expanded regulatory oversight of medical and rehabilitation expense reimbursements, reflecting a broader effort to streamline claims administration and control fraud[5].

The policy rationale was clear, to reduce courtroom congestion, expedite compensation, and stabilize premiums. I recall that the reception was anything but unanimous. Critics, particularly from the plaintiff bar, decried the new “threshold test” as vague and overly restrictive. Many accident victims fell into a grey zone, injured enough to be out of work or in need of care, but not sufficiently impaired to pass the statutory test for a tort claim. These victims of the new system became a focal point for criticism and judicial interpretation in the years that followed.

Meanwhile, lawyers who had cut their teeth in the combative world of tort litigation were now being asked to navigate a new regulatory maze. Accident benefits disputes no longer played out in courtrooms, but in the newly formed Financial Services Commission of Ontario (FSCO), through mediation and arbitration. This required an entirely new skill set of quasi-administrative advocacy, negotiation within rigid benefits schedules, and familiarity with evolving interpretive guidelines and precedent.

This was the legal and regulatory landscape in which I first honed my skills, in an era where questions of fault were no longer central to compensation. Under the new system, individuals injured in automobile accidents were entitled to receive a wide range of benefits from their own insurance company, regardless of who was at fault for the collision. Even drivers who were 100% responsible for an accident could still access substantial no-fault entitlements.

The OMPP[6] established a comprehensive suite of benefits, including:

  • Income Replacement Benefits of up to $600 per week for those unable to perform the essential tasks of their employment[7];
  • Medical and Rehabilitation Benefits, covering reasonable and necessary treatment and therapies[8];
  • Attendant Care Benefits, compensating for the cost of personal support services[9];
  • Housekeeping and Home Maintenance Benefits, assisting claimants who could no longer manage basic domestic tasks[10];
  • Caregiver Benefits, available to those who provided full-time care to dependents prior to the accident[11];
  • Death and Funeral Benefits, paid to surviving family members in the event of a fatality[12];
  • And Non-Earner Benefits, offering modest weekly compensation to individuals (such as students or caregivers) who were not employed at the time of the accident but experienced significant disruptions to their lifestyle[13].

This framework fundamentally shifted the role of legal practitioners. Rather than focusing on liability and fault, the early post-OMPP years emphasized navigating entitlements, interpreting regulatory eligibility criteria, and advocating for clients within a new administrative dispute resolution system at FSCO. It was certainly a formative period for me, one that demanded fluency not only in tort law, but in the intricacies of evolving accident benefits legislation and insurer practices.

For many of my senior colleagues, the transition was jarring. The speed and informality of FSCO proceedings were a sharp contrast to the evidentiary rigor of traditional trials. Yet this was the future of personal injury law in Ontario. Lawyers, insurers, and claimants alike were learning in real time how to operate within a system that prioritized expediency and standardization over discretion and judicial latitude. The OMPP set in motion three decades of continuous reform, each successive government tinkering, slashing, or recalibrating in an ongoing quest to balance justice with fiscal restraint.

1994: Bob Rae’s Bill 164 — Expanded Benefits, Limited Rights

In 1994, the New Democratic Party (NDP) government under Premier Bob Rae enacted Bill 164[14], representing one of the most generous expansions of no-fault accident benefits in Ontario’s history. Coming on the heels of the Peterson-era OMPP, which had introduced a transformative no-fault regime, Bill 164 took the system further, offering significantly broader and deeper coverage for accident victims, while placing strict limits on the right to sue in tort. This legislative shift reflected a broader ideological agenda pursued by the NDP under Premier Rae, which emphasized collectivism, state responsibility, and income redistribution. During this era, the government introduced a range of left-leaning reforms, including anti-scab labour legislation[15], pay equity expansion[16], and the controversial Social Contract Act[17], which imposed wage restraints on public sector workers while attempting to preserve jobs through unpaid leave days, commonly known as “Rae Days.”

Bill 164 removed the monetary cap on accident benefits and introduced a highly structured, entitlement-based system designed to provide more comprehensive support for accident victims[18]. It provided unlimited medical and rehabilitation benefits for those who were seriously injured[19], along with enhanced income replacement benefits calculated more generously and available for longer durations[20]. While caregiver, non-earner, and attendant care benefits were first introduced under the 1990 OMPP, the Bill 164 reforms significantly enhanced these entitlements, broadening eligibility and substantially increasing the maximum benefit limits, particularly for seriously injured claimants[21].

I remember clearly that one of the most controversial aspects of Bill 164 was its total bar on tort claims for economic loss, regardless of fault or financial circumstances. Unlike the earlier OMPP regime, which permitted lawsuits for both pain and suffering and economic loss if a claimant met the verbal threshold, Bill 164 eliminated that right entirely. Injured motorists were forced to rely exclusively on the no-fault benefits provided under the SABS, which included income replacement benefits capped at $1,000 per week. This posed a serious hardship for high-income earners, such as professionals and business owners, who could no longer sue to recover substantial lost earnings beyond the statutory cap. The inability to recover actual income loss through the courts, no matter how catastrophic the financial impact, became a lightning rod for criticism, and was widely viewed as an overreach that undermined fairness in serious cases[22].

The policy intent behind Bill 164 was clear, to reduce the burden on the courts, ensure more equitable and efficient access to compensation, and shift the emphasis from proving fault to providing support. For many accident victims, particularly those with no tort recourse, it represented a significant improvement in available financial protection.

However, the backlash from insurers and some consumer groups was swift[23]. Some critics argued that the removal of the right to sue effectively stripped accident victims of control over their claims, placing disproportionate power in the hands of insurers[24]. The administrative burden on insurers also grew, as the expanded benefit entitlements led to more disputes over quantum, duration, and medical necessity.

More pressing from a systemic standpoint was the cost. The enhanced benefits, particularly for long-term care and income replacement, drove up claims costs substantially. Combined with an economic recession and deteriorating underwriting results, insurers began sounding alarms about sustainability. Premiums rose, and market volatility increased. Bill 164 quickly became associated with a sharp uptick in loss ratios and a sense that the no-fault pendulum had swung too far.

The debate that followed set the stage for a significant course correction. Just two years later, the Progressive Conservative government under Premier Mike Harris would repeal Bill 164 with Bill 59, marking a return to a more balanced approach between no-fault entitlements and tort rights. But the imprint of the NDP’s experiment with expanded no-fault compensation remains a pivotal chapter in the evolution of Ontario’s auto insurance system.

1996: Bill 59 and the Harris Government’s Rebalancing

By the late ‘90s, I had transitioned into a unique position within the insurance industry. I was hired, in part due to my accident benefits background,  to assist in building the first in-house law firm within an insurance company in Canada, created by a major U.S.-based insurer. It was a demanding new role that placed me  directly at the intersection of policy, litigation strategy, and regulatory change. I was responsible not only for defending the insurer’s policyholders in tort actions, but also for representing the insurer itself in accident benefits disputes before the Financial Services Commission of Ontario (FSCO), then the province’s regulatory body for automobile insurance disputes.

Around that time, Premier Mike Harris and the Progressive Conservative government repealed the NDP’s Bill 164 and enacted Bill 59, marking a significant shift in Ontario’s auto insurance landscape.

The changes were aimed at correcting what many viewed as the excesses of the previous regime and at restoring a more balanced relationship between tort rights and no-fault benefits. Among the most significant reforms was a broad reduction in statutory accident benefits, particularly for individuals with non-catastrophic injuries[25]. The legislation also introduced the concept of “catastrophic impairment,” effectively creating a two-tiered system in which more generous benefits were reserved for the most seriously injured claimants[26]. At the same time, tort rights for pain and suffering were partially restored, though still constrained by a verbal threshold and now subject to a newly imposed monetary deductible[27]. Another key shift involved the transfer of certain health care costs from the public system (OHIP) to private auto insurers, obligating insurers to assume a greater share of responsibility for funding treatment directly[28].

From a legal and strategic perspective, the Bill 59 regime presented both opportunities and challenges. On the one hand, it gave insurers more tools to contain claim costs, particularly through thresholds and deductibles in tort. On the other hand, the accident benefits framework became more procedurally intricate. Every file had to be assessed not only for tort exposure, but also for the escalating complexity of the accident benefits claim, especially as disputes increasingly went through FSCO’s two-step ADR process of mandatory mediation followed by, if unresolved, formal arbitration.

For the U.S.-based insurer for whom I was in-house counsel, in navigating Canadian regulation, these changes required significant internal education. I was constantly fielding calls from the American home office explaining concepts like “verbal threshold,” “catastrophic impairment,” and “statutory deductibles” which were unfamiliar in American jurisdictions. The unique hybrid of public regulation and private insurance funding in Ontario demanded a recalibration of claims-handling protocols and litigation strategy. We had to advise our American client on how to interpret evolving regulations, manage FSCO timelines, and approach ADR proceedings in a way that aligned with both Ontario law and the company’s broader risk profile. I believe the eventual exit of the American insurer I worked for from the Ontario personal auto market was driven in large part by the regulatory complexity and cost of the accident benefits system.

The Bill 59 reforms represented an effort to reimpose predictability and financial discipline after the perceived generosity and cost of the 1994 reforms under the NDP’s Bill 164. But from the defence perspective, the system still required constant adaptation. Files could now engage multiple concurrent proceedings, namely tort litigation, FSCO mediation, and FSCO arbitration, each governed by its own deadlines, evidentiary standards, and tactical considerations. The complexity of the legal environment underscored the need for efficient coordination and deep subject-matter expertise, challenges that defined much of my practice in that era.

By 2000, after years immersed in the complexities of tort and accident benefits defence work both in large firm private practice and as in-house counsel for an American insurance company, I reached a professional crossroads. The work had been challenging and rewarding, but I felt my role had run its course. I stepped back, recalibrated, and launched my own plaintiff-side practice, shifting my focus to primarily advocating for individuals injured in motor vehicle accidents and other events causing personal injuries. It was a return to client-centred work, where my advocacy skills felt more purposefully applied and personally fulfilling.

2010 & 2016: Liberal Era Cutbacks Under McGuinty and Wynne

By 2010, I had been leading my own personal injury practice Patey Law Group for a decade. With a team of five lawyers and more than ten paralegals and law clerks, we regularly handled cases involving both tort claims and accident benefits. From my downtown Toronto office, I made near-weekly trips to FSCO’s North York hearing rooms for mediations and pre-arbitration hearings, always accompanied by a law clerk and carts of banker boxes stuffed with documents in tow. I wore out more than a couple of litigator bags in that decade, and relied on a trainer three times a week to maintain the physical and mental stamina needed to run my own practice.

The year 2010 also marked another pivotal moment in the evolution of Ontario’s auto insurance system. In response to mounting concerns over rising claims costs, particularly in the Greater Toronto Area, the Ontario Liberal government under Premier Dalton McGuinty introduced sweeping reforms to the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule. The government’s rationale focused on cost containment and system sustainability. Insurers pointed to increasing payouts, assessment costs, and treatment billing patterns, and raised alarms over suspected fraud[29] and inefficiencies within the system[30].

The 2010 reforms brought significant restrictions to Ontario’s accident benefits system. Weekly income replacement benefits were capped, and eligibility criteria became more stringent[31]. Medical and rehabilitation benefits for non-catastrophic injuries were cut in half, dropping from $100,000 to $50,000[32]. Perhaps most notably, the reforms introduced the Minor Injury Guideline (MIG), which placed many soft-tissue injuries into a predefined treatment protocol capped at just $3,500 in available benefits[33].

These changes were designed to standardize treatment and reduce unnecessary expense in lower-severity claims. However, they also brought a fundamental shift in how entitlement was assessed. Claimants were now placed into benefit streams based on predefined criteria, with limited flexibility or individualized discretion at the outset. For legal practitioners, this meant adapting to a system that relied more heavily on medical categorization, early insurer determinations, and documentation thresholds, rather than on courtroom adjudication.

The impact on dispute resolution was also significant. More disagreements over benefit entitlement were being handled through procedural forums such as mediation and arbitration at the FSCO, rather than through traditional litigation. Lawyers, insurers, and treatment providers all had to adjust to a more regulated, front-end managed process that prioritized administrative efficiency over extended adversarial engagement.

While the reforms succeeded in curbing certain costs and addressing insurer concerns, they also narrowed the scope of compensation for many claimants. The debate continues over whether the long-term effects of these changes achieved the right balance between affordability, fairness, and access to care.

Kathleen Wynne’s Liberal government continued the cost-cutting trajectory with its 2016 reforms to Ontario’s auto insurance system. One major change was the consolidation of medical, rehabilitation, and attendant care benefits into a single pool capped at $65,000 for non-catastrophic injuries[34]. At the same time, catastrophic benefits were significantly reduced, dropping from $2 million to $1 million in total available coverage[35]. The reforms also increased the monetary deductible on general damages awards to over $36,000, with the amount indexed annually to inflation[36].

These changes significantly curtailed the value of tort claims, even in serious cases, and reduced accident benefits further. Insurers praised the move. Plaintiffs’ counsel and advocates for injury victims did not.

2019–Present: Stability and Private Sector Focus Under Ford

The Ford government has to date concentrated its auto insurance reform efforts on rate regulation and fraud reduction rather than pursuing a structural overhaul of the accident benefit or tort systems. However, the foundational features of the current regime remain unchanged. The Minor Injury Guideline (MIG) continues to apply, limiting benefits for many soft-tissue injuries. Monetary deductibles on general damages awards persist and continue to rise annually with inflation[37]. Access to the catastrophic impairment designation also remains narrowly defined and difficult to obtain.

While no sweeping legislative overhaul has occurred under Ford, his government has preserved the Liberal-era cost-containment framework and signaled openness to private-sector innovation in claims management and digital filings[38].

Looking Ahead: April 2025 and the Procedural Tightening

Since 1988 when I started as a summer student at Smith Lyons, I have had a front-row seat to every wave of auto insurance reform in Ontario, from the courtroom trenches of tort litigation to the boardrooms of insurer strategy, and now the Zoom screens of mediation.

Each successive government has introduced reforms aimed at containing costs, improving system efficiency, and ensuring the long-term viability of Ontario’s auto insurance regime. For claimants, these changes have often resulted in adjustments to benefit entitlements, access to tort, and the overall scope of available compensation. I have worked through the expansive benefits of Bill164, the structural rebalancing of Bill59, and the increasingly procedural nature of the modern SABS framework. The system has evolved through cycles of expansion and restraint, with each iteration reflecting different policy priorities. Throughout these transitions, I have adapted, first as defence counsel, then as a plaintiff-side advocate, and now as a mediator guiding parties through a system that continues to grow in complexity and technical nuance.

And yet, the most consequential reforms may still lie ahead. The April 2025 amendments contemplated to Ontario’s Rules of Civil Procedure[39], aimed at accelerating timelines, tightening expert evidence rules, and imposing stricter proportionality in damages litigation, are poised to reshape the personal injury landscape once again. These changes will likely compress the litigation window, increase early settlement pressure, and limit the breadth of issues that reach trial. For plaintiffs, this may mean fewer opportunities to fully develop complex claims. For insurers and defence counsel, it will necessitate sharper triage and faster resolution strategies.

As a mediator, I anticipate that my role will become even more central in this evolving system. With courts signaling a stronger preference for efficiency over fulsome adjudication, mediation will evolve from a procedural requirement into more of a substantive forum for resolution. The ability to distill competing positions, contextualize evolving legal constraints, and broker pragmatic outcomes will matter more than ever. My decades of experience across both sides of the bar, and through every iteration of this system, I believe place me in a unique position to help parties navigate the next chapter.

Ontario’s motor vehicle compensation regime may continue to shift, but what remains constant is the need for perspective, rooted in history, guided by experience, and grounded in practical resolution. That’s where I intend to stay.

This blog is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.

1. https://canadianunderwriter.ca/news/claims/ontarios-25-year-no-fault-journey
2. Ontario Task Force on Insurance, Final Report of the Ontario Task Force on Insurance (Toronto: Ministry of Financial Institutions, May 1986): https://archive.org/search?query=creator%3A%22Ontario+Task+Force+on+Insurance.%22
3. https://www.erudit.org/en/journals/assurances/1990-v58-n2-assurances08623/1104746ar.pdf?utm
4. O. Reg. 672/90, s. 4(1) under the Insurance Act, RSO 1990, cI.8: “An income replacement benefit is payable for a period during which the insured person suffers a substantial inability to perform one or more of the essential tasks of his or her employment, at a weekly rate of up to $600.”
5. O.Reg.672/90, s.3(1) under the Insurance Act, RSO1990, cI.8: establishes no-fault entitlement to medical and rehabilitation benefits and requires insurers to review, authorize, and report these expenses.
6. O. Reg. 672/90 under the Insurance Act, RSO 1990, cI.8
7. O. Reg. 672/90, s. 4(1)
8. O. Reg. 672/90, s. 3(1)
9. O. Reg. 672/90, s. 3(2)
10. 0 O. Reg. 672/90, s. 3(3)
<11. O. Reg. 672/90, s. 3(4)
12. O. Reg. 672/90, ss. 3(5)–3(6)
13. O. Reg. 672/90, s. 3(7)
14. Insurance Statute Law Amendment Act, 1993, S.O.1993, c.10
15. Labour Relations and Employment Statute Law Amendment Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 21.
16. Pay Equity Amendment Act, 1993
17. Social Contract Act in 1993 (S.O.1993, c.5)
18. O.Reg.776/93 (Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule – Accidents After December31,1993, hereinafter “SABS”) under the Insurance Act, RSO 1990, c I.8.
19. O.Reg.776/93, s.3(1) under the SABS — Accidents After December31,1993 and Before November1,1996, made under the Insurance Act, RSO 1990, c I.8, states that an insured person is entitled to “reasonable and necessary” medical and rehabilitation benefits without a monetary cap, provided they have sustained an impairment as a result of a motor vehicle accident.
20. O.Reg.776/93, ss7(1)–(2), 8(2) under the SABS – Accidents After December 31, 1993 and Before Nov 1, 1996.
21. O.Reg.776/93, s.31 to s.37 re-established these benefit categories with expanded coverage, including unlimited attendant care for catastrophic injuries and higher weekly maximums for caregiver and non-earner benefits.
22. https://www.ola.org/en/legislative-business/committees/finance-and-economic-affairs/parliament-35/transcript/committee-transcript-1993-jan-27?utm
23. See https://canadianunderwriter.ca/news/industry/the-evolution-of-auto-reforms.
24. https://www.ola.org/en/legislative-business/committees/finance-and-economic-affairs/parliament-35/transcript/committee-transcript-1993-feb-16?utm
25. SABS, O.Reg.34/10, Schedule 1, ss. 18 & 19 (medical and A/C limits for non-CAT impairments set at $50K and $36K, respectively).
26. SABS, O.Reg.34/10, s.3.1(1) — defines catastrophic impairment and distinguishes it from non-catastrophic injuries for benefit entitlement.
27. SABS, O.Reg.461/96 (Court Proceedings for Automobile Accidents That Occur on or after November 1, 1996), s.5.1(1)–(2)
28. SABS, O.Reg.34/10, s.47(3) requires auto insurers to cover medical/rehabilitation costs before any supplementary or public health coverage applies.
29. https://news.ontario.ca/en/release/19141/cracking-down-on-auto-insurance-fraud?utm
30. https://news.ontario.ca/en/release/19141/cracking-down-on-auto-insurance-fraud?utm
31. SABS, O.Reg.34/10, ss.7(1)–(2)
32. SABS, O.Reg.34/10, s.18(3)(a)
33. SABS, O.Reg.34/10, s.18(1)
34. SABS, O.Reg.251/15
35. SABS, O.Reg.251/15, s.8(1) and s.18(3)(b)
36. Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8, s.267.5(8.3)–(8.5); and Court Proceedings for Automobile Accidents That Occur on or after November 1, 1996, O.Reg.461/96, s.5.1(1)–(2).
37. 2025 Automobile Insurance Indexation Amounts Guidance (FSRA), Appendix1: the deductible for general damages under O.Reg.461/96, s.5.1(1), is $46,790.05 for 2025, up from $46,053.20 in 2024—an increase tied directly to the annual Consumer Price Index adjustment required under Insurance Act, s.267.5(8.5
38. In the Ontario Legislature’s Hansard (November 22, 2018), MPPs celebrated legislation to “modernize the vehicle registration process”—part of the broader trend toward digital transformation in motor vehicle and insurance operations: https://www.ola.org/sites/default/files/node-files/hansard/document/pdf/2018/2018-05/house-document-hansard-transcript-3-EN-01-MAY-2018_L022.pdf?utm
39. https://www.ontariocourts.ca/scj/areas-of-law/civil-court/civil-rules-review/

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